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EMPHASIZING THE CONSTITUTIONAL IN
CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS
CHRISTINA BROOKS WHITMAN*

It has been surprisingly difficult to extricate constitutional litigation from torts. In this Article I would like to resist once more' the
idea that tort doctrines and tort categories provide a useful model for
constitutional decision-making. When it comes to deciding the merits
of a constitutional claim, torts is a distraction. That is the case
whether torts serves as a positive model for the constitutional cause of
action or as an alternative to be shunned. As part of this argument, I
also question the claim 2 that Monroe v. Pape,3 the 1961 case that
opened the door for damages relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 4 was the
source of a new and unprecedented substantive understanding of constitutional rights.
The danger posed by focusing on the way in which § 1983 damage
actions against state officials, and parallel Bivens-actions against federal officials, 5 are like or unlike tort actions is that problems raised by
specific remedies will drive thinking about constitutional substance.
This has been a recurring source of confusion in the opinions of both
the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts, and it ought not be
encouraged.
Part of the problem is the very effort to distinguish constitutional
law from torts. Over twenty years ago, in Paul v. Davis,6 the Supreme
Court tried to draw a bright line between the two. The plaintiff in
Paul had been branded as an "Active Shoplifter[ ]" in a flyer circu* The University of Michigan School of Law
1. I have made related arguments in Christina B. Whitman, ConstitutionalTorts, 79 MIcH.
L. REV. 5 (1980), and Christina B. Whitman, Government Responsibility for ConstitutionalTorts,
85 MicH. L. REV. 225 (1986). See also Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move
From Constitution to Tort, 77 GEO. L.J. 1719 (1989).
2. See Michael Wells, Constitutional Torts, Common Law Torts, and Due Process of Law,
72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 617 (1997).

3. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in partby Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658 (1978) (overruling Monroe's holding that cities were not persons subject to § 1983 liability).
4. Section 1983 provides that everyone who acts "under color of [state] law" and deprives
another of a federal right "shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress."
5. A decade after Monroe, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the FederalBureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Supreme Court recognized that damages actions could be
brought agdinst federal officers who violate constitutional rights.
6. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
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lated by defendant local law enforcement authorities.7 The Court
held that plaintiff's allegations would not support a constitutional
cause of action because they "would appear to state a classical claim
for defamation" under state tort law.8 This ruling was not a simple
matter of jurisdictional line-drawing or remedial allocation. In Paul,
the Court reached the merits of the plaintiff's claim and decided a
question of constitutional substance on the basis of a theory defended
wholly on the grounds that it maintained the purity of the separate
categories, constitution and tort. The Court held that the plaintiff's
claimed interest in preserving his reputation from unsubstantiated allegations of criminal conduct was not of constitutional stature because
it was an interest that might be vindicated through tort.9 This was not
a decision that freed constitutional substance from tort; instead, it was
driven by tort. Questions of tort law, although they were addressed
very superficially, 10 were essential to the decision of the case because
they defined the limits of constitutional protection.
Paul was an ominous beginning. Maintaining the line between
constitutional law and tort has not been as easy as the Court had
hoped. The relationship is complex, particularly when plaintiffs seek
damage relief for government misconduct. In constitutional tort actions, courts and Court-observers are still searching for a formula that
will make the line clear. Perhaps it should come as no surprise that
the attempts have ironic parallels in the efforts to bring coherence to
the chaotic field of torts. For example, even when tort principles are
not urged as rules of decision for constitutional damage actions," such
7. See id. at 695.

8. Id. at 697.
9. See id. at 697-98.
10. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist seems to have assumed that the plaintiff not only
should have, but could have, pursued his grievance through a tort action brought in state court.

However, Kentucky, like other states, gives its officials extensive immunities from tort liability.
See Note, Reputation, Stigma, and Section 1983: The Lessons of Paul v. Davis, 30 STAN. L. REV.
191, 204-05 n.88 (1977).
11. It has been some time since Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979), made it clear that

proof of the elements of a common law case is not sufficient to make out a constitutional claim.
What § 1983 requires is that the plaintiff establish (a) that the defendant was acting under color
of state law in (b) depriving the plaintiff of a constitutional right. See id. at 140. It is rare today

to see cases like Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969), in which the court never identifies
nor explicitly discusses constitutional requirements but relies instead on tort precedent to decide
whether a sheriff can be held liable under § 1983 for failing to release a prisoner when the indictments against him were dismissed.
Courts seem to understand now that a § 1983 case cannot be stated merely by reference to
tort. But the common law is not only insufficient; it is irrelevant unless referred to by the specific
constitutional provision upon which the plaintiff relies. Yet courts still talk about a "cause of
action for false arrest under § 1983" and about claims for false imprisonment, as if the § 1983
case were made by proving the existence of a common law tort and a violation of the Constitu-
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actions are occasionally treated as if they constituted a closed category
of constitutional litigation distinct from other claims of constitutional
protection, a category that calls for special substantive, as well as distinctive, remedial rules.12 This effort is reminiscent of the occasional,
and perennially unsuccessful, quest to articulate a unified theory of
torts.' 3 Although they often draw on concepts developed in torts,
these attempts to define a common thread seem, like Paul, to be motivated by a desire to delimit by some talismanic formula what is for
torts and what is for constitutional law. Another example: In recent
cases the Court has tended to analyze constitutional claims with a
rigid adherence to discrete, nonoverlapping categories of constitutional rights. This practice seems to be motivated by the same desire
to draw clear lines, but here the lines are drawn among constitutional
claims rather than between Constitution and tort. The rigidity of the
doctrinal categories most recalls the days of the writ system when it
was essential to distinguish firmly between trespass and case. This approach may appeal to the Court because it appears to confine judicial
decision-making, and avoids the risk of open-ended liability that
seems to be associated by some Justices with the development of negligence.14 In neither case is constitutional decision making truly independent of the analogy from tort.
In what follows, I begin by addressing the claim that Monroe initiated a new category of constitutional substance, focusing in Part I on
Monroe itself and in Part II on some of the ways in which the case can
be said to have opened the door to new, uniquely tort-like actions. In
Part III, I briefly lay out what can and cannot be said in support of the
overlap between constitutional law and torts. I address in Part IV the
unsatisfactory efforts that have been made to limit the reach of the
Constitution in the name of maintaining a line between constitutional
cases and ordinary torts. I conclude in Part V with an exploration of
liability for mistakes.

tion. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Commr's of Bryan County, 67 F.3d 1174, 1180 (5th Cir. 1995),
cert. granted, - U.S. -,

134 L. Ed. 2d 645 (1996). Proof of a violation of the Constitution ought

to be both necessary and sufficient, given the existence of state action.
12. See, e.g., Wells, supra note 2, at 618.
13. See, e.g., RIcI-ARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (4th ed. 1992); Richard A.
Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 151 (1973); George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REv. 537 (1972); see also OtUvER WENDELL
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw (1881).
14. The earliest articulation of this is by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Paul, 424 U.S. at 698.
See also, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:661

I
One way to enter this problem is to think about the significance
of the Court's 1961 decision in Monroe v. Pape. It is conventional,
and correct, to describe Monroe as clearing the way for the striking
increase in § 1983 litigation that has occurred over the past thirty-five
years. Monroe held that victims of official government misconduct
could sue in federal court even when state tort remedies were available and, in doing so, made it possible to use federal damage actions
5
against lawless officials to vindicate constitutional rights.'
Prof. Michael Wells proposes that Monroe made possible a new
category of backward-looking substantive constitutional law. 16 Prior
to that decision, affirmative challenges by private persons to state and
local government conduct were commonly raised through suits for injunctive relief.' 7 These actions, which were brought to halt or modify
official conduct, necessarily asked the courts to evaluate the constitutionality of ongoing government policies and practices. Completed
past actions do not support a request for forward-looking relief, but
past actions can be brought before a court when a litigant has the right
to seek compensation. By recognizing damage actions, Wells argues,
the Court created, for the first time, an incentive
to "conceive of past,
8
tort-like harms in constitutional terms.'
To make the claim that Monroe introduced something strikingly
new, Prof. Wells has to define the new category quite narrowly, as
dealing with "an injury that took place in the past and ...

had no

bearing on any other legal obligation owed by or to the victim."'19 The
very narrowness of the definition points to the problem with Prof.
Wells' claim: the federal courts were already involved in assessing the
constitutionality of completed official conduct in several categories of
cases. Substantively, constitutional law was already looking backward
as well as forward.
15. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Department of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The doctrinal holding that made this possible involved the interpretation of the statutory phrase "under color of [state] law." Before Monroe, it had been assumed
that only officers acting pursuant to state policy, formal or informal, could be sued under §1983.
See ERWrN CHEMERiNsKY, FEDERAL JtJRISDICION §8.3, at 430 (2d ed. 1994).

16. Wells, supra note 2, at 620. Monroe, Bivens, and related cases "had the effect of opening up a whole new field of substantive constitutional litigation."

17. Using suits for injunctive relief against state officials as a means of raising constitutional
challenges to government policies had been the primary affirmative remedy since Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
18. Wells, supra note 2, at 620.
19. Id.
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Although before Monroe most private litigants who sought to use
the federal courts to define constitutional standards governing official
conduct asked for forward-looking relief, the alleged injury often took
place in the past as well as in the present. Standing to seek injunctive
relief against ongoing government policies is easiest to establish when
the plaintiff has been the victim of past misconduct, 20 and litigants
who want to contest established but unarticulated official practices
rather than explicit policies must demonstrate the existence of many
specific past incidents in order to persuade the courts that a pattern
exists. 2 ' The other ways in which constitutional questions were commonly raised before Monroe v. Pape even more clearly required
courts to make after-the-fact judgments about official behavior. Challenges to government treatment of citizens could be raised as defenses
in criminal cases 22 or as responses to assertions of governmental immunity defenses in civil cases, 23 or affirmatively in the prosecution of

state and local officials under federal criminal civil rights laws.24
Although in most of these cases, as Prof. Wells says, the litigant
could raise his or her constitutional claim only because it affected
"other legal obligation[s] owed by or to the victim,' 25 the federal
courts were clearly in the business of applying constitutional standards
to completed official conduct long before Monroe was decided. Wells
tries to avoid this point by defining the category with which he is concerned even more narrowly-as limited to "personal injury-based
claims that resemble common law torts and may not be litigated in
constitutional terms except by means of a suit for damages. ' 26 Not
only does this characterization ignore the remote but genuine possibility of a federal criminal prosecution,2 7 it is precisely through this move
20. Past injury is not enough, however. The plaintiff must also demonstrate that the injury
he or she suffers is traceable to the defendant's conduct and is likely to be remedied by the

requested relief. See e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S.
95 (1983). Plaintiffs who have suffered no past injury may be able to establish standing by proof

that they are in real and immediate danger of injury. See United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures ("SCRAP"), 412 U.S. 669 (1973).

21. For an egregious example of the difficulty the requirement may pose, see Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).

22. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966).
23. This method of challenging government action has ancient roots, going back to English
cases such as Entick v. Carrington,19 How. St. Tr. 1030, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).

24. See, e.g., Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Screws v.United States, 325 U.S.
91 (1945).
25. Wells, supra note 2 at 620.
26. Id.

27. See infra text accompanying notes 57-60 (discussing Screws).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:661

that, despite his disclaimers, 28 the analogy to tort becomes central to
Wells' analysis.
To the extent that Monroe was a transition case, it was a transition to a new, additional remedy. That is apparent on the face of the
opinion. The substantive constitutional questions raised in Monroe
were no different from those that had been faced routinely by the
Supreme Court in its review of state and federal criminal convictions.
The Monroe plaintiffs challenged the actions of thirteen Chicago police officers who had broken into their home in the middle of the
night, conducted a humiliating and destructive search of the premises,
and subsequently detained the male, adult plaintiff for ten hours without taking him before a magistrate or allowing him to phone an attorney. 29 If any of the plaintiffs had been charged with a crime on the
basis of a confession elicited during the detention or evidence discovered during the search, their constitutional complaints could have
been brought before the state courts through a motion to suppress
and, if necessary, before the United States Supreme Court on appeal
of a conviction.
The ultimate substantive question-whether the actions of the
police violated constitutional norms-ought to be no different because plaintiffs' claims came to the Supreme Court as a request for
damage relief. Similar fact situations were standard fare in Fourth
and Fifth Amendment challenges to criminal convictions. 30 The
state's failure to initiate a criminal charge against Monroe foreclosed
this customary vehicle for arguing that government officials had gone
too far. Similarly, even before Monroe, a plaintiff who could establish
that the Chicago police were engaging in an ongoing pattern of discrimination or harassment could have, at least in theory, sought a federal injunction against future action of the same kind. 31 In the action
for compensatory relief that Monroe permitted, the fact that no conviction was sought might reduce the amount of damages suffered by
the plaintiffs. However, the Court made no suggestion that the remedial context would affect substantive standards used to evaluate the
police officers' behavior. Monroe acknowledged a new remedy. It did
28. Wells, supra note 2, at 646-47.
29. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 168-69 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Department
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

30. See e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914).
31. But see Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
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not make newly unconstitutional actions that had previously been
permitted.
Of course, a new remedy raises new remedial questions. Requests for damages relief raise unique issues concerning the link between the plaintiff's injury and the defendant's wrongdoing. These
require the courts to ask, perhaps using language of causation and
duty or obligation, whether the defendant is the appropriate source of
funds to compensate the plaintiff. Even when these questions are answered affirmatively, there may be reasons to protect the defendant's
resources through grants of immunity. Where relief is granted, the
courts must determine the appropriate measurement of damages.
These questions arise for the first time after Monroe, but they do not
go to the standards for official conduct.
I do not intend to dismiss the dramatic practical impact of
Monroe. By recognizing an action for damages, Monroe created a
new incentive to sue and made constitutional litigation available to a
new class of claimants. Previously, the only people who could even
attempt to challenge government action in court were those who were
subject to continuing government control, either through governmentinitiated litigation such as criminal prosecutions or through ongoing
conduct of the sort that would support a request for injunctive relief.
By expanding both the incentives to sue and the potential plaintiff
class, Monroe made a tremendous difference in the number and variety of constitutional actions. What I want to resist is the suggestion
that Monroe and its descendants ought to be seen as the vehicle for
rethinking the substance of constitutional law.
II
The possibility that materialized in Monroe-that significant
monetary recovery could be sought by victims of isolated and completed past government acts-seemed to call for new substantive rules
because the cases now permitted looked superficially like ordinary actions brought in torts. This created anxiety about what distinguished
constitutional law from torts. Prof. Wells' characterization captures
this worry. He sees post-Monroe damage actions as a single substantive category of suits that might be brought interchangeably in tort or
in constitutional law. 32 Some early courts even assumed that existing
tort rules ought to govern the disposition of cases that mirrored ex32. Wells, supra note 2, at 617-18.
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isting intentional torts. 33 The Supreme Court's worry about the overlap between Constitution and tort has taken several different forms.
Some cases express the fear that Monroe has opened the door to the
sort of the open-ended liability for mistakes that is found in negligence law;34 others are concerned that governments will be held liable
for the acts of rogue officials.35 Both are troubling possibilities because they threaten to drain fiscal resources to compensate for events
that even conscientious officials cannot perfectly control. Yet, in none
of the salient respects-protection of personal security, redress for official mistake, applying constitutional standards to unauthorized conduct-is Monroe discontinuous with prior law. Care must be taken to
ensure that attempts to limit Monroe do not limit other remedies as
well because the case cannot be treated as substantively unique.
Prof. Wells is certainly not the first commentator to describe
Monroe as creating a new category of cases. 36 However, his characterization of that category as encompassing cases that straddle the
boundary between constitution and tort 37 may make it most obvious
why the Supreme Court has wanted to restrict constitutional damages
actions out of a fear that the new category they allegedly create will
make § 1983 a "font of tort law." Wells argues that Monroe defines
a new category of constitutional actions that could as easily be brought
in tort because they seek compensation for invasions of personal security that are protected by the common law. 39 The key to this characterization of the category is the nature of the injury inflicted.
33. See supra note 11.

34. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989);
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986); Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 546 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring in the result), overruled in part by Daniels
v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (overruling Parratt's holding that negligence is sufficient for
procedural due process).

35. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984); Parratt,451 U.S. 527; Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See also Susan Bandes, Monell, Parratt, Daniels and
Davidson: Distinguishinga Custom or Policy from a Random, Unauthorized Act, 72 IowA L.
REV. 101 (1986).

36. For influential early writing, see Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 2532 (1972) (discussing Bivens), and Marshall S. Shapo,
Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U. L. REV. 277 (1965).

37. Wells, supra note 2, at 619. "Boundary cases" refer to those that are based upon "harms
that may be litigated in common law tort actions such as battery or defamation, yet may also give
rise to constitutional tort liability when the defendant is a government officer." Id. at 619 n.7.
38. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).
39. Therefore an important case for Prof. Wells is Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977),
which he describes as standing for the proposition that "constitutional tort reaches all the interests protected by common law," Wells, supranote 2, at 618, because it defines "personal security
as an aspect of the 'liberty' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id. at 622.
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Putting aside the question whether a comparable tort action is
really available given the existence in many states of sovereign immunity doctrines that protect government officials from being subject to
tort liability on the same terms as private citizens,40 it is true that
many unconstitutional acts do damage by causing physical and emotional injuries of the sort traditionally protected by tort law. 41 Unlike
many personal injury actions, however, constitutional wrongs are not
only, or even primarily, subject to legal sanction because of the character of the injuries they inflict. It might be closest to the truth to say
that constitutional damage actions are like the classic intentional torts
that protect the dignity of the person of the plaintiff by specifying limits on the defendant's potentially intrusive conduct.42 The focus of the
intentional tort claim is on the defendant's harmful or offensive conduct, and the injury to the plaintiff may be merely dignitary, or even
nominal. 43 Even that analogy fails to capture the essence of constitutional wrongs, which are defined with reference to the unique power
that government has over those subject to its jurisdiction. In constitutional cases, although the plaintiff must establish injury, the substantive heart of the case is the special power of the government to do
harm, rather than the quality of the plaintiff's injury.
Monroe also expanded the reach of substantive constitutional law
by making it easier to argue that constitutional rights have been violated by a government officer's mistake.44 Injunctive actions, by and
large,45 are addressed to deliberate policy. They challenge ongoing
conduct, which would presumably have been modified upon request if
it were based on mistake. Damage actions, in contrast, do not disappear upon correction of erroneous behavior; the claim for compensation accrues once the damage is done, and the claim continues to be
ripe until compensation is paid. Since the accidental injuries that underlie so much of tort law can often be said to result from mistakes, in
the sense that they would have been avoided had they been precisely
40. See

W.

PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS §132, at 1056-69 (5th ed.

1984).

41. Excessive force claims are a clear example; they look like the intentional torts of assault
and battery. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). Another, which resembles medical
malpractice, is the action for egregiously inadequate medical care of a prison inmate which was
the subject of suit in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
42. See KEETON ET AL, supra note 40, chapters 2-3.
43. CLARENCE MORRIS & C. ROBERT MORRIS, JR., MORRIS ON TORTS §1, at 23-24 (2d ed.

1980).
44. I return to this problem infra at pp. 688.92.
45. Some suits for structural relief, particularly challenges to conditions in prisons and
mental institutions, seek to require affirmative steps to eliminate conditions that are due to limited resources or to neglect rather than deliberate policy.
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foreseen, this is another way in which Monroe appears to have moved
constitutional litigation closer to tort. Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist's concern in Paul v. Davis46 that constitutional litigation might
collapse into tort is expressed in precisely these terms. Paul itself involved deliberate official action-the publication of a flyer that contained names and photos of "Shoplifters" and included a picture of
the plaintiff, who had never been convicted of that crime. 47 But Chief
Justice Rehnquist was worried even then that failure to draw a clear
line between constitutional cases and tort cases would open the federal courts to the whole range of tort actions, including those based on
accidental injuries. 48 Among the consequences he feared was the possibility that a claim would be brought by "[a]n innocent bystander mistakenly shot by a policeman or negligently killed by a sheriff driving a
'49
government vehicle."
By authorizing damage actions against officials for their past behavior, Monroe did make it possible for plaintiffs who had been accidentally injured by official conduct to take their grievances to court
even when there was no threat of continuing or future injury.50 This
was not previously possible in an injunctive action, for the reasons
described above, or in a criminal action against the officers, for that
has stringent mens rea constraints. 51 But even before Monroe, the
Court had frequent occasion to recognize constitutional error in official mistakes. That was most obviously the case when constitutional
violations were raised as defenses to criminal prosecutions. Often the
police behavior challenged in that context was deliberate, but it could
also be accidental-a misreading of what a suspect had understood, a
confusion about consent or about addresses, even a clerical error in
entering data. Prophylactic constitutional rules, such as the warning
required by Miranda v. Arizona,52 not only deterred deliberate official
misconduct, but also made it less likely that officials would inadvertently misinform suspects of the scope of their constitutional rights. It
is erroneous, then, to see Monroe as initiating constitutional inquiry
into official mistake.
Even more clearly, Monroe did not introduce for the first time
the possibility that the Constitution would be concerned with random
46. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 695.
See id. at 698.99.
Id. at 698.
See Dellinger, supra note 36.
See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101 (1945).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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and unauthorized conduct by individual government officers. Again,
many of the most prominent criminal procedure cases can be described in those terms. Monroe itself, even though it involved thirteen
policemen, could be described as an egregious case of random and
unauthorized misconduct. That was, in essence, the state's argument,
which took the doctrinal form of a claim that the officers' actions, because they violated Illinois law, were not "under color of [state] law"
as required by §1983. 53 The bulk of the Supreme Court's opinion was
addressed to rejecting that argument on the grounds that Congress,
fearing that state legal protections might exist in theory but not in fact,
had intended to reach even unauthorized official conduct.5 4 This
55
holding forms the key affirmative conclusion of the Monroe opinion,
a fact that may have contributed to the impression that extending the
reach of the Constitution to unauthorized official conduct was the major advance made by the decision.
Yet, that extension was remarkable only in its application to damage actions. Monroe made possible a new remedy, not a new sort of
unconstitutionality. Injunctive actions against unauthorized official
conduct had long been available. Standing and proof problems could
be insurmountable barriers even if suit were brought in a location
where official lawlessness was widespread and targeted at a specific
population.5 6 But that aside-if a court could have been persuaded
that these Chicago policemen would come back to harass Mr. Monroe
and his family again-the conduct at issue in the case ought to have
justified the issuance of an injunction. Officials who engaged in egregious unauthorized conduct could also be prosecuted prior to Monroe
under federal criminal statutes such as 18 U.S.C. § 242. That had been
established sixteen years earlier in Screws v. United States,57 an infamous example of unauthorized police misconduct. Screws involved
the criminal prosecution under federal civil rights law of a Georgia
sheriff, who, with the assistance of a policeman and a special deputy,
58
arrested an African-American man on the charge of stealing a tire.
53. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
54. See id. at 174.
55. The Court also ruled that the City of Chicago could not be sued under §1983 because
the legislative history indicated that Congress had not intended to make municipalities liable
under the statute. Id. at 187-92. That holding was reversed in Monell v. Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
56. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976);
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
57. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
58. Id at 92.
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At the door of the courthouse the officers beat the handcuffed suspect
to death. 59 The majority of the Supreme Court, reviewing the conviction of the officers, rejected the defendants' claim that such flagrantly
illegal behavior could not be said to have occurred "under color of
'60
[state] law."
This history is well-known. I rehearse it to make a point that
tends to be slighted: Because Monroe did not create a new substantive
category of constitutional law governing the conduct of government
officials, substantive (as opposed to remedial) decisions in § 1983
cases have implications for the entire range of constitutional decisionmaking. It is important that fears about the extent of remedies are
not articulated as limitations on constitutional rights, with unexplored
consequences on the entire range of possible actions. 61 This can be a
difficult principle to keep in mind. Even judges who are sensitive to
remedial context can slip into language that seems to have substantive
implications.
An example of this phenomenon can be found in the Court of
Appeals decision United States v. Lanier.62 Lanier involved an appeal
to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit brought by a state judge
who had been convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 242 for coercing women
who were litigants, court employees, or who otherwise had business
with his court into performing sexual acts. 63 On the face of it, Lanier
looks like an appropriate case for federal prosecution. There were
reasons to doubt that the state criminal justice system would deal effectively with the problem: the defendant was from a locally prominent family in a rural county; he had previously served as alderman
and mayor of the city; and his brother was the local prosecutor. 64 Despite the cumulative evidence of appalling sexual misconduct, the conviction was reversed on the ground that the federal prosecutors had
not established that Judge Lanier had violated a constitutional right
that had been specifically articulated by Supreme Court decisions at
59. See id. at 92-93.
60. See id. at 107-113.
61. "The protections of the Constitution do not change according to the procedural context
in which they are enforced-whether the allegation that constitutional rights have been transgressed is raised in a civil action or in a criminal prosecution, they are the same constitutional
rights." United States v. Reese, 2 F.3d 870, 884 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 928
(1994).

62. 73 F.3d 1380 (6th Cir. 1996).
63. Id. at 1383-84, 1397.
64. See id. at 1394, 1403, 1405.
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the time he engaged in the challenged acts. 65 As the majority clearly
understood, this requirement was unique to the imposition of criminal
sanctions for it was responsive to the need to give fair notice to potential criminal defendants. 66 Whatever the merits of the decision as a
criminal matter, 67 the case is also troubling for what it suggests about
the reach of the Constitution generally. In making the point that a
substantive due process right to be free from sexual coercion by a
judge had not been made sufficiently specific, the Court of Appeals
occasionally spoke in terms that cast doubt on principles of constitutional substance that had been generally accepted and thereby suggested that no constitutional rights had been violated at all.68 One
principle undercut by the opinion was the Supreme Court's statement
in Ingraham v. Wright69 upon which Prof. Wells puts so much
65. See id. at 1393-94. This holding was reversed in United States v. Lanier, 117 S. Ct. 1219
(1997).
66. The Court of Appeals was applying the decision in Screws, which upheld § 242 against a
charge of vagueness by construing it to apply only to those situations in which the state establishes "a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right made definite by decision." Screws
v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 103 (1945) (plurality opinion).
The Court in Lanier distinguished between constitutional rights that could be vindicated
through § 242 and those that could be remedied through civil law. 73 F.3d at 1387. It said that
the former might be a small subset of the latter because Congress had not intended to criminalize all constitutional violations:
Congress does not evidence in § 242 a deliberate intent to create an evolving criminal
law which expands to include new constitutional rights as they become a part of our
civil constitutional law.
Id.

The requirement that a constitutional right have been made specific before it can be the
basis of sanctions imposed on an individual official has a civil counterpart in the qualified immunity defense. The immunity bars suits against officials in their individual capacity unless they
violate constitutional rights that are clearly established at the time of the acts being challenged.
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Presumably this defense would make it difficult
for Judge Lanier's victims to proceed against him for damages. The Supreme Court's decision in
Lanier held that the Screws notice requirement and the civil "clearly established" qualified immunity tests are essentially the same. 117 S. Ct. at 1227-28.
67. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was troubled that there had been no
Supreme Court opinion interpreting the "right to bodily integrity" arguably protected by substantive due process to encompass sexual misconduct. Lanier, 73 F.3d at 1388. Yet the extortion
of sexual "favors" by a judge who threatens his victims with loss of a job or loss of custody of a
child, both raised by the evidence in the case, seems undeniably to be abuse of government
power. Would Screws have been decided the other way, would the conviction have been reversed, if the law enforcement officers prosecuted there had raped the person in custody rather
than beating him? The Court in Lanier required a Supreme Court decision before a right could
be made the basis of a § 242 prosecution, but some issues never come before the Supreme Court
because they are not sufficiently controversial to justify the expenses of appeal.
The Sixth Circuit distinguished Screws on the grounds that it raised issues of equal protection and procedural due process, neither of which were relied on by the prosecution in Lanier.
Id. at 1393-94.
68. See id. at 1388-89.
69. 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977).
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weight, 70 the statement that the Due Process Clause protects against
"unjustified intrusions on personal security." The Court of Appeals
described it as merely "dicta."'71 And the Sixth Circuit opinion also
questioned whether, if any such protection did exist, it would include a
right to be free from sexual assault.72
If the line between limits on remedies and limits on constitutional
substance can be so easily blurred in a criminal context, where constraints on judicial sanctions are taken most seriously, the risks that
something similar will happen in suits for damages is apparent. In
criminal cases, remedies are confined because of our fears of government overreaching when personal liberty is at stake. The dangers in
the civil context are not so pressing. It is true that the years since
Monroe have seen an unprecedented expansion of civil rights litigation under § 1983. 73 Much of that litigation involves suits for damages, and some of the most troubling § 1983 cases look like they are
"really" tort cases because they seek damages for aberrational misconduct by individual officers. Yet, efforts to contain this growth by
narrow interpretations of substantive constitutional rights cannot be
confined to suits for damages. They have implications for other contexts. If the Constitution is held to be inapplicable where official misconduct looks too much like the subject of tort, other remedies will be
foreclosed as well. Consider Screws, for example. If the victim had
survived and sued for damages, Screws would look like an ordinary
intentional tort case-a battery action with elements of false imprisonment. Because the defendants were local law enforcement officials,
it is also a classic example of the abuse of official power.
III
If Monroe is seen as merely creating a new remedy, what sense is
to be made of the apparent overlap between constitutional damage
actions and torts? Tort concepts cannot be completely excised from
§ 1983 decisions. We lack another language in which to discuss what it
means to say that one person (or institution) has injured another per70. Wells, supra note 2, at 631-35.
71. See Lanier, 73 F.3d at 1388.
72. See id. at 1388.
73. For data on the growth of § 1983 litigation, as well as careful commentary as to the
data's significance, see Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J.Schwab, The Reality of Consitutional
Tort Litigation,72 CORNELL L. REV. 641 (1987); Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, What
Shapes Perceptions of the Federal Court System?, 56 U. Cm.L. REV. 501 (1989); Stewart J.
Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Consitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence of the
Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 719 (1988).
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son in such a way that it is appropriate to require him to pay compensation. But in constitutional cases, the person who is said to have
wronged another is by definition someone who has a special power to
do harm because of his government position. Because the government is implicated, the nature of the inquiry is affected.
Personal injury claims, claims of dignitary injuries, and claims of
loss of property sound like the business of tort law. Chief Justice
Rehnquist's flirtation in Paul v. Davis with the idea that constitutional
74
injuries are, by definition, those that cannot be redressed in tort,
would, if taken seriously, exclude all claims of this sort. Yet, the facts
of Paul indicate that the categories are not really collapsed even if
relief is available in both contexts. The plaintiff in Paul alleged that
local law enforcement authorities had publicly and falsely declared
him to be a shoplifter. 75 Rehnquist characterized this claim as one of
injury to reputation, which therefore seemed to him to sound in defamation rather than constitutional law. 76 Yet, the government's involvement presents an alternative characterization which Rehnquist
ignored: The plaintiff had been deprived of his right to a trial before
being officially branded as a criminal. Viewed in this light, Paul is
comparable to Screws, if much less egregious.
The division between tort and constitutional law that Chief Justice Rehnquist proposes in Paul, which could be described as a new
version of the nineteenth century attempt to designate mutually exclusive separate spheres of state and federal authority, 77 may have
seemed appealing and appropriate to him because the case involved
reputation, an almost-dignitary injury 78 not protected in express terms
by any clause in the Constitution. Perhaps dignitary injuries seemed
more elusive, less pressing. Perhaps they seemed to be a poor fit with
the "life, liberty, and property" language in the Due Process Clause.
But that very language makes it apparent that a "separate spheres"
strategy will not work. Since tort doctrine vindicates injuries to
"property" and to "life," both of which are expressly reached by the
Constitution, some overlap is inevitable. Some deprivations of property and liberty by government actors will raise constitutional ques74. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 697-98 (1976).

75. See id. at 695-96.
76. See id. at 697, 701.
77. See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 550 (1876).
78. Defamation is a dignitary harm in that it is defined as a statement that "tends.. .to harm
the reputation of another," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977), and, unless special
rules apply, does not require any demonstration that actual injury has occurred. But Chief Justice Rehnquist is correct that the gist of the action at common law was injury to reputation.
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tions, and similar losses caused by private actors may fall easily under
torts. In fact, the Court has, in other contexts, felt quite comfortable
about this. The Justices have seemed, for example, to be most confident about the breadth of protection available under the Due Process
Clause when its language is interpreted with reference to the common
law. 79 And, as Prof. Wells points out,80 the year after Paul, in Ingraham v. Wright,8 ' the Court interpreted the Clause's reference to "liberty" to encompass the interests in personal security defined by the
common law of tort.
Yet it is error in the other direction to stress too much the overlap
between constitutional wrongs and torts. A constitutional claim cannot be made out by proof that an official has committed a common
law tort. 82 Despite some early cases to the contrary, 83 that much now
seems clear. But even foregrounding what is shared, the way in which
both can be used to vindicate interests in "personal security" can be
misleading, for it diverts attention from the most important task of
constitutional litigation, the setting of standards for official behavior.
Many, perhaps most, unconstitutional acts are problematic even
though they pose no threat to property or risk of physical harm. Some
examples, such as First Amendment violations and infringements on
equal protection, are obvious. This is the affirmative significance of
the familiar point that procedural due process protections do not
guarantee a correct result. What is guaranteed is fair process; the loss
of that may occur even when there is no injury that is tangible in a
monetary or physical sense.
Limitations on remedies, both compensatory and prospective,
may constrain the vindication of these less tangible interests in individual cases-perhaps by requiring that some showing of significant
injury be made before a remedy will be awarded. 84 But these considerations ought not affect the underlying question of whether the government officials have acted unconstitutionally. One of the purposes
of § 1983 is to provide compensation for the individual victims of official action, 85 but redress for victims could be provided by a variety of
79. See e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (opinion of Scalia, J.); Board

of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 714 (1877).
80. Wells, supra note 2, at 618.
81. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977).

82. See supranote 11.
83. See e.g., Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1968).
84. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
85. See id. at 253-54.
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mechanisms, including government-funded welfare and insurance
schemes. The more essential function of constitutional litigation, from
the perspective of society as a whole, is that it is a mechanism for
setting minimum standards for official behavior when democratic and
administrative safeguards fail.
In negligence, where proof of injury is essential to stating the
cause of action, we leave much to private discretion. Actors who engage in risky activities are permitted to take the chance that their conduct will cause no injury. If they bet correctly, no sanctions will be
imposed because no action can be stated. And if they do cause harm,
they are required only to compensate for the loss. Society has more of
a stake in constitutional behavior by officials. This is the sense in
which the closest torts analogy to constitutional litigation, and the one
typically drawn, is to the intentional torts. Like constitutional law,
intentional tort doctrine offers no general protection of personal security. Instead, it defines limits on defendants' behavior. This is not
to say that intentional torts should serve as a guide or a template for
defining constitutional actions, or that negligence should not. My
point is, rather, that there is no easy fit between the two. Constitutional litigation has a different subject matter than torts, though both
can redress invasions of personal security, because it is concerned
uniquely with the limits on government behavior.
IV
If the distinction between torts and constitutional damage actions
turns on the latter's focus on abuse of government power, both will
naturally evolve in different directions because of their different substantive concerns. But the working out of these concerns takes time.
It is tempting, then, to look for some way to draw the distinction
quickly and clearly. In this Part I describe several attempts-some
adopted by the Supreme Court and one suggested by Prof. Wells.
The post-Monroe growth in constitutional litigation has made the
Supreme Court explicitly nervous about the implications of recognizing constitutional rights. The Court has been concerned about both
the workload of the federal courts and the financial burden of litigation on state and local governments. 86 These concerns are not
uniquely raised by damage actions, but they have special bite in cases
that raise the possibility of substantial monetary recovery, especially if
86. See e.g., Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391-92 (1989); Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457
U.S. 496, 533 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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compensation must be paid for every mistake made by governmental
officials that implicates constitutional interests. If the interests protected by the Due Process Clause are defined broadly, the potential
for liability under that provision alone can be enormous.
One reaction on the part of the Court has been to construct immunity doctrines addressed specifically to the problems posed by actions for damages.8 7 Whatever the merits of the specific contours of
these doctrines,88 limiting devices addressed directly to the damage
remedy seem, in general, to be appropriate both as a way to control
the potential financial burden on governments and as a device to reduce the incentive to sue.
Another response, which worries me more, is the reluctance on
the part of the Court, a reluctance of increasing strength in the last
decade, to acknowledge that the Constitution is implicated at all. So,
thirty-five years after Monroe, § 1983 litigation has not given rise to an
ongoing discussion, grounded in constitutional principle, on the appropriate limits of government, but has led instead to a system of constitutional litigation that is uncomfortably close to a modern version
of the old forms of action, where the plaintiff must take care to fit his
or her claim into one of the very narrow doctrinal categories that have
been made available for use. A case can be lost because the litigant
mistakes the nature of her claim and points to the wrong constitutional category. And, just as under the common law writs system,8 9
the penalty of dismissal will be imposed even when the Justices themselves cannot agree on the proper pleading for the plaintiff's case.
An example of this phenomenon is Albright v. Oliver,90 in which
the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a substantive due process
claim brought by a plaintiff who alleged that the defendant police
detective had issued a warrant for his arrest without probable cause. 91
87. See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349
(1978).

88. For critical analyses of the qualified immunity for executive officers, see, e.g., Laura

Oren, Immunity and Accountability in Civil Rights Litigation: Who Should Pay?, 50 U. PrTr. L.
REv. 935 (1989); David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism and the Restriction of ConstitutionalRights, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 23 (1989).
89. See, e.g., Scott v. Shepherd, 2 Win. BI. 892, 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (1773).
90. 510 U.S. 266 (1994).
91. According to the plaintiff's allegations, the paid informant who told defendant that
plaintiff had sold her cocaine gave little evidence of reliability. See id. at 293-93 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Over 50 prosecutions based on her accusations were aborted or dismissed. See id.

In the incident that led to a warrant being issued for plaintiff's arrest she misidentified the al-

leged seller twice before defendant asked her if the seller could have been the plaintiff. See id.

The "cocaine" allegedly sold by plaintiff turned out to be baking powder. See id. Plaintiff was
then charged with "the sale of a substance which looked like an illegal drug." Id. at 268. The
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There was no opinion of the Court. Four Justices, in an opinion by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, said that the plaintiff erred in relying on substantive due process.92 They thought he might have been able to state
a claim under the Fourth Amendment but declined to reach that93question because it had not been raised in the petition for certiorari. Justice Souter agreed that the Fourth Amendment was the proper home
for the plaintiff's claim. 94 He wanted to distance himself from the plurality's adoption of the view that the specific guarantees of the Bill of
Rights exhaustively state the constitutional constraints on criminal
procedure, but was willing to follow their lead in this case because he
thought that the Court ought to be particularly reluctant to recognize
claims based on substantive due process. 95 Justice Kennedy, joined by
Justice Thomas, thought that substantive due process analysis was appropriate but did not support a ruling for the plaintiff on the facts of
the case. 96 Justices Stevens and Blackmun dissented. 97 They would
have held that the initiation of a criminal prosecution on the basis of
98
extraordinarily weak evidence violated due process.
The implications of this approach, which engages in a search for
the single correct constitutional provision, can be seen in a Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit case which follows Albright-Johnson
v. Phelan.99 The plaintiff in Johnson challenged the constitutionality
of the Cook County jail's routine practice of allowing female guards to
monitor naked male prisoners in cells, showers and toilets. 100 The majority opinion written by Judge Easterbrook found the case relatively
easy: although plaintiff stated his claim as one based on due process,
"[o]bservation is a form of search," so it was appropriately analyzed
101
under the Fourth Amendment rather than the Due Process Clause.
Unlike the Supreme Court in Albright, Judge Easterbrook went on to
analyze the Fourth Amendment claim, but he found it wanting. 102 In
Hudson v. Palmer,10 3 a Fourth Amendment case that involved a
criminal case against him was dismissed on the ground that the charge did not state an offense
under Illinois law.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Albright, 510 U.S. at 273, 275.
See id. at 275 n.7.
See id. at 288-90.
See id. at 287-89.
See id. at 286.
See id. at 291.
See id. at 297-98.
69 F.3d 144 (7th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 145.
Id.
See id. at 145-46.
468 U.S. 517 (1984).
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guard's search of a prison cell and alleged confiscation of a prisoner's
personal property, the Supreme Court had held that prisoners have no
expectation of privacy. 10 4 Therefore, the plaintiff in Johnson, who was
incarcerated pending trial, had no Fourth Amendment claim. Even if
the Fourth Amendment had not been dispositive, Judge Easterbrook
said, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause would not help the
plaintiff because it has been interpreted to require deference to prison
regulations "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests,"105
and an Eighth Amendment claim would fail because "[a]ny practice
allowed under the due process analysis is acceptable under the Eighth
Amendment too.

' 10 6

Cross-sex monitoring of prisoners, Judge Eas-

terbrook held, is "reasonable" because "it makes good use of the
staff' and "reduces the need for prisons to make sex a criterion of
1 07
employment."'
Judge Posner, dissenting, did not begin his analysis of the case by
parsing through a string of constitutional provisions. Instead, he focused directly on what was being done to the prisoners. 0 8 Noting
that Judge Easterbrook's analysis could apply just as smoothly to the
surveillance of female prisoners by male guards, Judge Posner discussed the significance of the nudity taboo in American society. 1°9 He
found the Supreme Court's narrow reading of the Fourth Amendment
in Hudson to be inapposite because Johnson involved something more
serious than the privacy expectation claimed in Hudson.110 Judge Posner thought that the Cook County practice involved "the infliction of
humiliation on prison inmates"' 1 and, as such, was forbidden by the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments." 2 Under Judge Easterbrook's analysis, the various separate
provisions of the Constitution become a series of traps for plaintiffs.
Judge Posner began by focusing on the government practice, defined
what was at stake for the prisoners 113 and then turned to the Constitu104. See id. at 526-30.
105. Johnson, 69 F.3d at 146 (quoting Tuirner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
106. Id. at 149.
107. Id. at 147.
108. See id. at 151-52.
109. See id. at 152.
110. See id. at 154.
111. Id. at 153.
112. See id.
113. One of the grounds for difference between Judge Easterbrook and Judge Posner was
their dispute over what is necessary to serve the ends of gender equality. Judge Easterbrook
argued that the prison practice of cross-sex surveillance serves Title VII purposes of promoting
the employment of women as prison guards. See id. at 147-48. Judge Posner responded that
compliance with a federal statute cannot be used to justify a violation of the Constitution. See id.
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tion to see if the practice was forbidden. Judge Easterbook's opinion
reads as if he is most concerned with clearing paper off his desk. By
contrast, Judge Posner seems to have actually listened to what the
plaintiff was describing.
The rigid categorization of claims seen in opinions like the plurality's in Albright and Judge Easterbrook's in Johnson works as a limiting device only because the individual constitutional provisions are
defined very narrowly. The impulse to rein in the broader implications of Monroe, combined in some instances with what seems to be a
misunderstanding of torts concepts, has led the Supreme Court, in a
series of cases that have been widely criticized, 114 both to assume that
tort law will provide protection in the "ordinary" case and to develop
a set of limiting constructs that go beyond immunities and categorizations. If these were constraints uniquely on damages actions, 115 the
effort to limit liability would be less troublesome, for the doctrines
would function like immunities. However, all too often these limitations are articulated as interpretations of the scope of constitutional
protections.
The assumption that adequate tort alternatives will be available
to the plaintiff can have substantive bite. An early example is Paul v.
Davis.116 The Court began its opinion by saying that the plaintiff's
"complaint would appear to state a classical claim for defamation actionable in the courts of virtually every state. 11 7 That became the
at 153-54. He associated the acceptance of cross-sex surveillance with "radical feminists" who

would eliminate the "dicholomization of the 'sexes."' Id. at 153. Neither judge responded to a
more likely feminist argument which would distinguish between the surveillance of women by
men and the surveillance of men by women on the ground that, in American society, these mean
different things. It may be more humiliating for a woman to be observed by a man than for a
man to be observed by a woman. If so, a gender-neutral approach to analyzing the case would
be inappropriate.
114. For criticisms, see Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection,Liberty
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507 (1991); Laura Oren, The State's Failure to
Protect Childrenand Substantive Due Process:DeShaney in Context, 68 N.C. L. REv. 659 (1990);
Henry Paul Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 423-29 (1977);
David L. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist. A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REv. 293, 324-28

(1976).
115. Thus the requirement that plaintiffs who seek redress from governmental entities, as
opposed to individual officials, establish that their injury flows from some "official policy or
custom," Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), does not fall into this category even

though it imposes an additional requirement not present in tort. Superficially, the Monell requirement seems to require "something more" than tort in its rejection of respondeat superior
liability. But it was derived by analysis of the legislative history underlying § 1983, rather than as

a matter of constitutional interpretation. For that reason, it functions like an immunity, limiting
certain actions under § 1983, but not affecting constitutional protections in other contexts. See
id.
116. 424 U.S. at 693 (1976).
117. Id. at 697.
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reason why the complaint did not state a claim under the Constitution.
Yet, the very element that would make Davis' claim a constitutional
case, the fact that the defendants were exercising official authority
when they described him as a criminal, may well have barred the tort
action on grounds of sovereign immunity. 118 A more careful, and
more narrow, argument of the same sort was accepted in Ingraham v.
Wright.1 9 In that case state tort law was held to provide all the process that was due to students who had been subjected to severe corporal punishment in junior high school.' 20 The possibility of tort
recovery satisfied the majority of the Court even though a tort action,
if it existed, 121 would focus on the reasonableness of the teacher's belief that punishment was appropriate rather than on the charge at the
heart of the students' case: their argument that the beatings were excessive even if some punishment was justified.
In other cases, the Court, without much attention to the nuances
of tort doctrine, has devised unprecedented, more stringent requirements of causation and duty for due process cases. In essence, these
requirements treat constitutional cases as if they must be somehow
more egregious or harder to establish than an ordinary tort. Martinez
v. California22 rejected an action brought against members of a parole board by the survivors of a young girl who was murdered by a
parolee. Without reaching the question whether the parole board had
acted unconstitutionally, 2 3 the Court held that the girl's death at the
hands of the released prisoner "cannot be fairly characterized as state
action."'1 24 Using tort language of proximate cause, the Court said
that her death was too remote a consequence of the parole officers'
118. See supra note 10.
119. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).

120. See id. at 674-79.
121. The Court did inquire into the existence of a common-law tort remedy under Florida
law. It decided to accept the views of the courts below and the concession of the petitioners that
such a remedy existed even though there were no reported cases. See idt at 676-77 & n.45.
122. 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
123. See id. at 280. On the merits, the result may well have been correct. Although the
complaint alleged that the parole decision was "reckless, willful, wanton, and malicious," Id.

there was no indication that the decision to release the prisoner violated any substantive or

procedural constitutional protections. See id. Failure to comply with state formalities does not
make out a constitutional case, and due process requirements do not guarantee that correct decisions will be made. The plaintiffs could not argue that they had a right to appear before the
board. Such a claim would make no sense because the specific victim was, obviously, not identifiable in advance. Indeed, the defendants themselves were charged to represent the public's (and

thus the potential victims') interests. In the absence of some more specific allegation of constitutional error, plaintiffs did not make out a case of abuse of government power. See id. at 281-83.
124. Id. at 284.
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action to hold them responsible. 125 To the extent that proximate
cause reflects foreseeability, this seems an odd decision; the possibility
of future criminal activity is one of the most important factors that
parole decision makers are charged to consider. In similar situations,
states have found officials liable for the negligent release of dangerous
individuals. 126 Martinez used tort terms loosely in order to create an
especially strict causation standard for constitutional cases.
In cases like Martinez, it seems odd to say that there was no
causal connection between the parole decision and the subsequent
murder, or that the parole officials ought not be asked to evaluate
whether the risk of future criminal activity is high enough to warrant
future incarceration. Arguments of this sort are even more difficult to
make when the potential victim can be identified in advance. 27 Perhaps for that reason, nine years later when the Court was faced with a
similar case in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services, 28 it chose to borrow tort concepts of duty, rather than causation, to limit government responsibility. DeShaney was a substantive
due process case brought against county social services personnel
who left the plaintiff child with his abusive father until the father inflicted a beating that left the child permanently and profoundly retarded. In rejecting government responsibility for the child's
condition, the Court used the tort distinction between misfeasance
and nonfeasance 129 as a means of interpreting the reach of Due
Process:
the harm was inflicted not by the State of Wisconsin, but by
Joshua's father. The most that can be said of the state functionaries
in this case is that they stood by and did nothing when suspicious
circumstances dictated a more active role for them. 130
The Court recognized that tort law had departed from rigid adherence
to the distinction to such a degree that most states would have im125. See id. at 285.
126. Although some states have required that the threatened victim be specifically identifiable in advance, see, e.g., Thompson v. Alameda, 614 P.2d 728, 736 (Cal. 1980), others have
imposed a duty to act or warn when the danger is more general. See, e.g., Hamman v. Maricopa,
775 P.2d 1122, 1128-29 (Ariz. 1989). States may be more reluctant to impose duties to protect on
governments than on private custodians. The torts cases rejecting liability are put in terms of
duty, rather than causation, which draws attention to the policy basis of the decisions.
Note, too, that negligence law requires reasonable prudence (an appropriate weighing of
costs and benefits), while substantive due process would in most cases be satisfied if there were a
rational basis for the decision.
127. Compare Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
128. 489 U.S. 189, 201-02 (1989).
129. See CLARENCE MORRIS & C. ROBERT MORRIS, JR., supra note 43, at 127-28.
130. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203.
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posed liability on a private defendant who ignored similar evidence of
abuse. 131 As in Martinez, it would be odd to suggest that the social
workers had no "duty" to consider whether the child was in grave
danger in deciding if it would be appropriate to intervene. The
Court's ruling that the state was not "responsible" for the harm to the
child may be most easily understood as a decision about the responsibility to pay damages. Again, the problem was seen as one of drawing
a line between constitution and tort. The Court was worried that
"every tort committed by a state actor [would be transformed] into a
constitutional violation.' 132 It responded to that worry by creating an
especially high standard of "duty" for constitutional cases.
When the Eighth Amendment is the relevant constitutional provision, the justification for requiring "something more" than what
would be necessary to establish a tort is drawn from that amendment's
reference to "punishments." In Farmer v. Brennan, 33 a transsexual
prisoner claimed that defendant prison officials had violated his constitutional rights by failing to protect him from another inmate who
had beat and raped him. Earlier decisions by the Court had held that
a prisoner claiming a violation of the Eighth Amendment must establish that the defendant official acted with "deliberate indifference"' 34
to a substantial risk of harm. The question in Farmer was whether
"deliberate indifference," which had come to be equated with recklessness, should be interpreted according to a civil law approach,
which holds a person responsible if he "fails to act in the face of an
unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that
it should be known,"' 35 or according to a criminal law approach,
which "generally permits a finding of recklessness only when a person
disregards a risk of harm of which he is aware."'1 36 Justice Souter,
writing for the Court, rejected the tort approach in favor of the crimi131. See id. at 201-02 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §323 (1965) and other torts
authorities). In tort law, the analysis would have turned on whether there was a "special rela-

tionship" between the plaintiff and the defendant or on whether the defendant had voluntarily
undertaken to aid the plaintiff. Instead of trying to define an appropriate standard for government conduct, the parties and the Court spent much of their time trying to apply these tort
concepts to the facts of this case.
132. Id. at 202.
133. 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1974-75 (1994).

134. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1986). Whitley itself can be seen as an instance
of tort-avoidance in that the Court stressed that the standard was necessary to make it clear that
there would be no liability for ordinary acts of negligence. See id. at 319.
135. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1978, (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
LAw OF TORTS § 34 (5th ed. 1984)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §500 (1965).

136. Id. at 1978-79.
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nal law standard. 137 This result, while plausible as an interpretation of
the Eighth Amendment, has the effect of creating a particularly formidable requirement that prisoners seeking to raise constitutional claims
prove something "like tort but more egregious" because of the rule
that all challenges to the treatment of convicted prisoners must be
brought under that constitutional provision rather than under the Due
Process Clause. 138 Here, categorization combines with "torts-plus" requirements to foreclose most substantive protection.
Prof. Wells' response to this dilemma, like the Court's, is substantive. He would reject the Court's "categorical approach" entirely and
urges that all egregious invasions of personal security by government
officials (those cases that he describes as falling on the border of constitutional law and torts) be treated under a single constitutional category - substantive due process. Wells criticizes the Court's reliance
on tort concepts in Paul v. Davis,139 yet his own analysis is driven by
the "tort-like"' 40 character of constitutional cases that involve injuries
to personal security and by the existence of a compensatory damage
remedy. Wells, like the Court, makes "substantive constitutional law
4
follow[ ] the availability of damages."' '
Prof. Wells does not make the mistake of adopting tort categories
to analyze constitutional claims. 142 Nor does he make the mistake of
Paul v. Davis by foreclosing constitutional inquiry altogether. But he
does start with tort, and he tries to distinguish constitutional analysis
from ordinary personal injury claims by adding "something more" to
create the constitutional cause of action. That extra element is an
"egregious" state of mind, evidence that power has been deliberately
abused by a government official. 143 Under Prof. Wells' analysis the
Constitution is not concerned with just any technical assault and battery, but only with those that are the product of improper motivation.
And it is not concerned with just any failure to act or dereliction of
duty, but only with a particularly callous indifference.
Wells' standard would include, by definition, the most outrageous
abuses of governmental power, such as that before the Court in
137. See id.
138. See e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 326-27 (1986).

139. See Wells, supra note 2, at 647.
140. Id. at 620.
141. Id

142. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
143. This is a requirement only for cases involving invasions of personal security, so it does
not apply to claims based on procedural due process. See Wells, supra note 2, at 650 n.185.
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Screws. 144 To that extent, his suggestion that substantive due process
145
be taken seriously is a necessary corrective of the Court's position.
But in making a malicious state of mind necessary as well as sufficient,
Wells forecloses the possibility that nonprocedural constitutional violations may exist independent of official malice. Abuse of government power is not always accompanied by a hostile mind. Certain
intrusive practices that threaten personal injury or personal dignityperhaps choke holds, or strip searches, or institutional crowding, or
the routine exposure of nude inmates to the gaze of the opposite
sex-might be quite consistent with an official's honest effort to do
the job efficiently and effectively. An official's neutral, or even admirable, mental state ought not, in itself, be an insurmountable barrier
to the claim that the Constitution has been violated. To return to my
theme: The good faith of the official seems more relevant to the question of whether he or she should be personally held liable for damages-as indeed it once was under immunity doctrine"' 6 -than to
whether the Constitution has been infringed.
The impulse to view constitutional cases as "torts-plus" follows
naturally from Wells' focus on personal security. If analysis begins
with the injury (personal security, especially if defined as physical
well-being), rather than by focusing directly on abuse of power, the
theoretical overlap between tort and constitutional law is quite real.
The pull of the analogy from torts, then, encourages Wells to look for
some way to narrow the category.
It is dangerous to define constitutional claims as a narrow subset
of tort law because tort law has been particularly ineffective in dealing
with precisely the sorts of interests and injuries that are at the center
of constitutional law. To the extent that tort remedies address abuses
of power, they do so purely fortuitously. The problem begins with the
tort definition of redressable injury. Although dignitary claims have
been recognized in actions for battery and reputation, torts has focused on physical injuries. Traditional tort doctrines have not developed mechanisms for vindicating interests in speech, belief, respect, or
144. See supra text accompanying notes 57-60.
145. See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review,
and ConstitutionalRemedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309 (1993).
146. The qualified immunity available to executive officials originally had both an objective
and a subjective component. It could be lost by proof that the official acted in bad faith or that

he had violated a settled constitutional right. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). In
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), the Court jettisoned the subjective element as too
easily pled and too productive of litigation. Current law protects even malicious officials as long
as they do not unreasonably ignore established law.
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fair and equal treatment. Claims of gender and race discrimination or
harassment can be brought only indirectly. Prof. Wells might respond
that his recommendation addresses only those cases in which the
plaintiff asserts an injury that is comparable to those traditionally
redressable at tort. 47 But even here, tort law, which is not addressed
specifically to government conduct except through the development
of immunity doctrines that limit liability, does not fully capture the
impact of official invasions. It may well be more frightening, more
humiliating, to be subjected to a strip search by police officers, even
when they are acting in good faith, than it is to be the victim of a
private battery or imprisonment. Part of the additional injury may be
due to gender or race inequalities, which play no explicit role in tort
analysis. Part may be due to the very fact that the search is conducted
under a good faith claim of right.
When dealing with questions of constitutional substance, it is as
inappropriate to craft doctrine to react against tort as it is to adopt
tort concepts to define wrongdoing. There is no more reason to think
that constitutional actions should be defined as the most egregious
cases carved out of the broader category of torts than there is to think
that an official's tortious conduct creates a constitutional case.
Although there are constitutional referents to interests defined by tort
law, most clearly in the Due Process Clause, and understandings of
tort responsibility undoubtedly informed the § 1983 drafters' understanding of what a compensatory statute would accomplish, 148 more
open-ended appeals to tort are at best confusing. At worst, they divert attention from the fact that the Bill of Rights was specifically
designed to do what that tort has been quite reluctant to do-to define the limits of government conduct.
That said, there are lessons of legal process that constitutional
thinkers might learn from the history of torts. One lesson learned in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is that rigid categorical distinctions among causes of action are difficult to maintain and often
unfair in practice. Another lesson, still in the process of being absorbed, is that theories that purport to subsume all actions into one
overarching approach are more productive of academic insight than as
147. Wells does not intend to impose a state of mind requirement on First Amendment or
procedural process cases. He does intend to capture many cases now thought of as raising
Fourth Amendment and Eighth Amendment claims under substantive due process to the extent
they involve invasions of personal security.
148. Because of this, decisions like Wilson v. Garcia,471 U.S. 261 (1985) (applying statutes
of limitations for personal injury actions to claims under §1983), are not vulnerable to the criticism I am making.
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rules for deciding cases. The great strength of torts, grounded in the
common law method, is that it has been able to build on the past because that past is not described too rigidly. Constitutional interpretation, it might be responded, is grounded on a text and is much less
open to legislative correction, so greater rigidity is appropriate. Yet,
our constitutional tradition has more in common with common law
method than this response suggests. The cases that sort the constitutional claims into discrete categories sometimes talk as if the Framers
had in mind a master plan that created the perfectly appropriate provision for every possible claim, a plan so precise that it drew, for example, distinctions based on whether the plaintiff is a free citizen, a
convicted prisoner, or a pretrial detainee. There is no evidence that
such a plan existed, and the courts never really refer to one. Instead,
the categories emerge by application of the interpretive principle that
149
the narrow and more specific provision preempts the more general.
That principle makes sense when one provision deals clearly and directly with the matter before the Court. Applied to cases on the periphery of several constitutional provisions, it, too, is a construct with
little basis in history. The Court can seldom point to a specific desire
by the drafters of any particular provision to cut back on the reach of
another. In some instances, such as the relationship between the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment, the more general provision follows the more specific. The text of the Constitution
was a political creation, and we have evolved an interpretive tradition
that respects its open texture. The Court's attempt to treat the Constitution as a series of mutually exclusive delineation of 'rights, like
Wells' effort to subsume a wide variety of claims under substantive
due process, may have been conceived as a way of bringing coherence
to the field of constitutional litigation. Because of its rigidity and because it is used so much more often to dismiss claims than to recognize
them, the Court's approach seems instead to be driven by the bald
policy to discourage the assertion of constitutional rights. This is an
abdication of responsibility rather than judicial restraint.
V
The hardest cases for the Court-the cases where the overlap
with "ordinary torts" seems most troublesome and the threat of extensive liability most severe-are the cases of official mistake. These
were the most powerful of Chief Justice Rehnquist's examples in Paul
149. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
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v. Davis, where he worried about liability for "an innocent bystander
mistakenly shot by a policeman or negligently killed by a sheriff driving a government vehicle."'1 50 Case of mistake are also most difficult
for Prof. Wells; he defines some of them, those brought under the
Fourth Amendment or procedural due process, as beyond the reach of
his paper 15' and excludes the rest from constitutional protection by his
proposed requirement that constitutional plaintiffs establish bad faith
in order to recover.
I would not be so quick to put negligent government behavior
beyond constitutional reach. Another of Chief Justice Rehnquist's examples in Paul raises the possibility of official liability to "a person
arrested by law enforcement officers who announce that they believe
such person to be responsible for a particular crime in order to calm
the fears of an aroused populace.' 52 If the officers made the announcement knowing that the plaintiff was innocent, Professor Wells,
if not Justice Rehnquist, would hold them responsible. But is it so
obvious that the Constitution would not be violated by their good
faith, but mistaken, evaluation of the evidence supporting the public
statement? In such a situation, the arrest would be held unconstitutional for lack of probable cause. 153 Why not the officials' statement
too? In exclusionary rule cases, the Court has distinguished between
a conclusion that the Fourth or Fifth Amendment has been violated
and the application of the remedy excluding the evidence. Where police officers act in good faith, the exclusion may be admitted even if
the Constitution has been violated.' 54 In my hypothetical case, too,
lack of bad faith may affect remedies and support an immunity for the
officers, without also calling into question the constitutional standard
for police conduct.
Prof. Wells may agree with my analysis of the negligent accusation on the grounds that the claim it raises is properly one of due
process. Let us turn to another of Chief Justice Rehnquist's examples,
that of the innocent bystander shot by the police. 5 5 Should we dismiss out of hand the possibility that there may be constitutional constraints on police officers' use of firearms in ways that threaten
150. 424 U.S. 693, 698 (1976).
151. See Wells, supra note 2, at 619-20. One consequence of his standard is that excessive
force cases such as Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), will be decided under a subjective,
rather than an objective, standard. See id.
152. 424 U.S. at 698.
153. Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933).
154. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
155. Paul, 424 U.S. at 698.
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innocent people? The authority to use guns in such a risky fashion is a
government power that can be abused by negligent and reckless, as
well as by intentional, behavior. The case of the negligently driven
government vehicle seems most easy to me. In the absence of evidence that the accident involved an abuse of uniquely governmental
power, perhaps because it came at the conclusion of a high-speed
chase, 156 there is no reason to characterize this as a constitutional
case.
If damage remedies are made unavailable where good faith exists, what would be the point of insisting that the Constitution might
still have been violated? Once we put aside situations that appear to
be analogous to torts, the most serious problem with defining constitutional substance with reference to torts becomes clear: whether the
analogy is to intentional torts, to egregiously callous dereliction of
duty, or to ordinary negligence, the comparison to torts casts the dis157
pute as an isolated injury inflicted by one individual upon another.
This strikes me as being exactly backward. It is certainly appropriate
to be concerned about compensation for the victims of official lawlessness. But what is special about constitutional law, and distinguishes it
from tort, is its concern with institutional power, and therefore with
systemic injustice. 158 Trust in authority can be lost through neglect
and honest misunderstanding as well as through deliberate wrongdoing. Despite the Court's reluctance, 59 there should be mechanisms
for articulating and reinforcing constitutional limits on government
behavior that do not depend on the existence of a "bad actor" with a
malicious state of mind. One possibility would be to bring suit against

156. A constitutional claim may arise if the government has exercised sovereign immunity to
give itself protection from ordinary tort liability. A government does exercise unique power
when it protects itself from liability by mechanisms unavailable to others. Whether exercising

sovereign immunity in this way is an abuse of power that violates the Constitution has not been
expressly answered by the Supreme Court. Justice Stevens, the only Justice to reach the ques-

tion in Davidson v. Cannon, decided that a state policy that defeats recovery is not, it itself,
unconstitutional. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 336, 342 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in
the judgments in Daniels and Davidson).
157. Obviously, many tort actions involve multiple plaintiffs and/or multiple defendants, but
determination of causation, the calculation of damages, and even the standard of care are highly
individualized. Both intentional torts and negligence actions evaluate conduct with reference to
real or hypothetical individual actors; institutions are held liable, under respondeat superior, for
the errors of their employees. Only strict liability departs from this paradigm.
158. See Fallon, supra note 145.
159. See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
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Another possibility
a government entity, rather than an official. 160 161
relief.
declarative
or
injunctive
seek
to
would be
Perhaps the Court has been so reluctant to encourage "constitutional tort" suits precisely because they address isolated and particular
governmental errors rather than systemic wrongs. Litigation that
seeks widespread social change by challenging generally applicable
laws or common practices-cases like Brown v. Board of Education'62
or Baker v. Carr163-seems more obviously to be the work of constitutional law. Monroe v. Pape,'64 which on its face only involved one
incident and one family in one city on one night, represents the opposite extreme. Yet too much can be made of this distinction. When
there are no judicial mechanisms to impose sanctions on isolated incidents of the sort that occurred in Monroe, similar incidents can accumulate and become intrinsic to the functioning of the law enforcement
system without any formal articulation of policy. That can create systemic injustice even when there is no bad faith, but it is a particularly
serious problem when the individual officials are malicious or callous.
Permitting damage actions based on evidence of egregious misconduct
by individual officers addresses the problem. If damages actions are
to be constrained in order to protect the public fisc or the resources of
individual officials, constitutional claimants ought to be able to use
other, equitable remedies to capture those cases in which unconstitutional conduct poses a recurring problem.
Injunctions preceded damages as constitutional remedies.1 65
Although this reverses their relative priority in nonconstitutional
cases, it is not just an ironic historical accident, but an indication of
which is the more appropriate tool for rectifying systemic harm. The
Constitution should be more concerned with ensuring that government is committed to proper practices than ensuring that no mistakes
are made. The latter goal cannot be achieved. If constitutional litigation is, as the Court appears to believe, a powerful tool that ought to
be used sparingly, its primary focus should be systemic unconstitutionality. It is more important that government actors be given guidance
160. Christina B. Whitman, Government Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 85 MICH. L.
REV. 225 (1986).
161. Christina Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REv. 5 (1980).
162. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
163. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
164. 365 U.S. 167, 167 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658 (1978).

165. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), preceded Monroe by over 50 years.
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as to the proper limits of their use of power than that every individual
wrong be compensated by federal law.
By stressing the importance of preserving remedies for systemic
conduct I do not mean to endorse the distinction that the Court has
drawn between "established state procedures" and individual officials'
"random and unauthorized conduct."'1 66 This distinction may have appealed to the Court because it purports to address government practices that have the widest impact. It also responds to the worry,
triggered by Monroe, that §1983, if interpreted broadly, will lead to
expensive litigation and an award of damages every time a government official makes a mistake. However, it is one more example of
using constitutional substance, here an interpretation of Due Process,
to deal with a problem of remedy. Moreover, systemic unconstitutionalities are not confined to established state procedures. The distinction is insensitive to the way in which organized power can be
abused through unarticulated practices and through the toleration of
(or failure to pay attention to) a series of isolated incidents, even
when formally constitutional policies are in place. Sometimes the
abuse of power occurs because of the malice or bad faith of a government official. At other times, as the Court has recognized in many
cases under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, it exists because government actors have failed to conform to objective rules of behavior
that should be observed in recurring confrontations between officials
and the public. A substantive due process approach of the sort Prof.
Wells suggests, one that focuses on the individual official's state of
mind, will reach the worst examples of abuse of power, but it does not
capture all these cases.
The Supreme Court has made it particularly difficult to obtain
injunctive relief against practices that are not rooted in formal policy,
yet randomly injure large numbers of individuals. Plaintiffs who seek
to challenge these practices have failed because they cannot establish
that they will be subject to them in the future even if they have been
in the past 16 7 and because it is difficult to persuade the Court that

something as tangible as a practice really exists. 16s An appropriate
way to respect the distinction between constitution and tort would be
to give equitable relief more freely in response to claims of this sort.
But, given the Court's reluctance to do this, the distinction between
166. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.

167. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
168. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
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established procedures and isolated unauthorized actions is especially
pernicious because it forecloses all relief. If the proof standards for
injunctions are to be placed so high, damage actions are the only
means of reaching those situations where abuse occurs in practice despite the existence of formally constitutional policies. Damage relief
becomes important, not because every official mistake should be corrected, or even because every violation of the Constitution should be
remedied, but because, without the right to sue for compensation, certain sorts of abuse of power will entirely escape judicial scrutiny.

